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and, even more importantly, do. The underlying
assumption of this methodology is that art forms,
such as jazz, are social practices that depend on
understandings that, though shared by most participants in the practice, may not be directly or
immediately consciously accessible. Thus, everyone stands to gain from a successful project of this
kind—not only those unfamiliar with jazz, but also
those deeply involved in it. The former will gain
an understanding of an artistic tradition unfamiliar to them; the latter may come to understand
something new about experiences that are deeply
important to them.5 It is also worth noting, however, that this is a comparative project in musical
ontology. That is, I am interested in how jazz is
similar to, and different from, other Western musical practices. As a result, I strive to use terms,
notably the term ‘work of art,’ univocally across
the different traditions I discuss. I return to this
point below.
I take as my primary target “standard form”
jazz, where a paradigmatic performance consists
of a number of solo choruses framed by a pair
of statements of the head. But what I say should
apply to almost all jazz, including free improvisation and performances of highly detailed jazz
scores. There are two major jazz traditions that
my view may not apply to, however. One is the
jazz song tradition, by which I mean the tradition
in which the focus of the performance is a singer
singing a song. The fact that it is a relatively autonomous tradition can be seen in its being given
a separate treatment (some might say its being
largely ignored) in historical, musicological, and
philosophical writing about jazz.6 (I do not mean
to exclude vocalizations within the instrumental
tradition, such as scatting solos by instrumentalists, Dizzy Gillespie’s calls of “salt peanuts!”, and
even the applause, laughter, and other commentary of the performers that make up part of some
instrumental jazz performances.) The other tradition that may not fit the ontological view I defend
is jazz “fusion.” These exceptions are not arbitrary, though they can only be made sense of once
I have presented my arguments. Their justification
is of the same sort I have offered for projects in
higher-level musical ontology in general. It seems
to me that people listen to jazz singing and fusion
in importantly different ways from those in which
they listen to “standard form” instrumental jazz,
because musicians in these traditions are doing
significantly different kinds of things; part of this
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difference can be captured by a higher-level ontological theory, just as those who offer ontologies
of classical music, for instance, commonly restrict
the historical scope of their theories and exclude
classical electronic music from consideration. I
briefly note my views about these exceptions
below.
i. jazz as a tradition of works for
performance
The first suggestion I consider is that jazz is ontologically like classical music.7 Just as The Rite
of Spring is a work of classical music, composed
by Igor Stravinsky and performed by numerous
groups (led, in a few cases, by the composer himself), so “Sophisticated Lady” is a work of jazz
music, composed by Duke Ellington and performed by numerous groups (led, in a few cases, by
Ellington). This view is defended explicitly by
Carol S. Gould and Kenneth Keaton, and by James
O. Young and Carl Matheson, but it seems to be
implicit in many other discussions of jazz, whether
philosophical, musicological, or popular.8
i. Locating the Work. One challenge for the ontologist who argues that jazz is like classical music
is to argue for a principled way to determine which
sound structure out of a range of potential candidates is the work.9 For example, in order to accurately perform the work implicit in a particular
performance of “Body and Soul,” should one attempt to produce (i) sounds with exactly the sonic
profile of this performance, (ii) sounds indistinguishable to a knowledgeable listener from those
of this performance, (iii) sounds recognizable as
an imitation of this particular performance, (iv) a
performance with the same harmonic or melodic
structure, or what?10 A common suggestion is that
the work in jazz is quite a coarse structure, something like the harmonic structure plus a melody,
or at least a melodic shape. Young and Matheson
call this the “canonical model.”11 But they point
out problems with both parts of the proposal. For
a start, in some performances of a standard, no
melody close to the original is played. (Lennie
Tristano’s performance of “All of Me” is their example.) But if we discard that aspect of the proposal for what the work is, and rely on the harmonic structure alone, we are left with too coarse a
structure, since there are many different standards
with the same harmonic structure. The classic
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example here is the “Rhythm changes”—the
harmonic structure of Gershwin’s “I Got
Rhythm”—that is shared by many different standards, such as Charlie Parker and Dizzy Gillespie’s
“Anthropology” and Lester Young’s “Lester
Leaps In.”
Young and Matheson also consider performances of free jazz.12 Relying on harmonic structure or melody to determine the work here, they
argue, would result either in free jazz performances’ not being of works, or in their being of
works that are instantiated in only one performance.13 I am not sure that the latter suggestion
is even coherent. The concept of a musical work
that Young and Matheson are working with is that
of a work for performance of the kind common in
classical music. But these are works appropriately,
intentionally, and commonly performed multiple
times. This is a fundamental part of the culture of
classical music. But this is clearly not what is going on in free jazz. It is not just a coincidence that
free jazz “works,” conceived as melodic and/or
harmonic structures, do not receive multiple performances. Nor is the problem that it would be too
difficult to perform such a “work” again. Merely
making the attempt would be considered bizarre,
and is arguably antithetical to the whole ethos of
free jazz.
Young and Matheson consider two other candidates for the work in free jazz, both of which are
also considered by Richard Cochrane.14 Cochrane
defends a conception of musical works as sets of
rules concerning what is compulsory, forbidden,
and optional in the production of a performance.
He then points out that there are such rules governing free jazz performances. For instance, you
must not regurgitate Coleman Hawkins’s “Body
and Soul” over and over again throughout a free
jazz session. One conclusion Cochrane draws is
that many, or all, free jazz performances may
be considered performances of one and the same
work. This strikes me as a reductio of the theory.
Young and Matheson similarly say that this suggestion “does not bear serious consideration.”15
If these sorts of rules constitute musical works,
then all classical performances can be considered
performances of the same work, as can all performances with the same harmonic structure, and so
on. There is more to a work than merely being a
common denominator of several performances.
But the other suggestion considered both
by Cochrane and by Young and Matheson is
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amenable to the latter’s general conclusion. Young
and Matheson suggest that the work in free jazz
performances might be something like a cluster
of motives—with neither melodies nor harmonies
determined.16 On this view, two takes for Ornette
Coleman’s Free Jazz might be considered two performances of the same work. This accords well
with Young and Matheson’s general conclusion
that there is no single kind of work in jazz. We cannot pick just one level of description, one kind of
structure, to designate as the right level at which to
look for jazz works: “Jazz works are defined . . . by
sets of tacit guidelines for performance. Two performances . . . can follow these guidelines and be
said to instantiate the same jazz standard. No
completely general account can be given of these
guidelines, which differ from one period and style
of jazz to another.”17
This conclusion might sound initially like one
Stephen Davies has argued for with respect to
classical music.18 Davies argues that there is variation in the ontologies of classical works. Some are
“thinner” than others; that is, fewer of the properties of a fully authentic performance are determined by the work. So, like Young and Matheson,
Davies argues that there is no single ontological
level at which we should look for works in classical
music. The musico-historical context, in conjunction with what the composer does, determines the
constitutive features of the work.
But this seeming agreement between the ontologies of classical and jazz—between Davies
on the one hand and Young and Matheson on
the other—conceals an important distinction. Although Davies argues that classical works are socially constructed, in that their musico-historical
context partly determines their constitutive features, he resists the further claim, argued for
by some, that the constitutive features of works
change over time.19 For instance, Mozart’s piano
concertos include “gaps” where the performer is
supposed to improvise a cadenza. But, like many
composers, Mozart wrote out cadenzas for several
of his concertos, as options for those who were
unable to improvise. By the end of the nineteenth
century, such “gaps” were no longer left in concertos, for various reasons:
Some have explained this shift by citing the impatience
of composers toward performers who would disfigure their compositions by inappropriate improvisations.
Moreover, as we see it, one must consider the influence
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of the romantic concept of the artist as an authoritative
and solitary hero. Then, too, as musical composition expanded during the romantic period, the integrity of the
musical structure became too complex for a spontaneous
improvisation of pitches and durations to be dependably
supportive.20

But this did not mean that the cadenzas Mozart
wrote out for his concertos became constitutive of
those works. Perhaps as improvisation became a
lost art to most classical performers Mozart’s cadenzas were played more frequently, but the work
still calls merely for some cadenza, preferably improvised, in the style of Mozart’s day.
The variations in jazz performances that
Young and Matheson point to are thus not like
the variations in classical works that Davies
discusses. Recall that Young and Matheson claim
that (1) “two performances . . . can follow [the
same] guidelines and be said to instantiate the
same jazz standard,” and that (2) “no completely
general account can be given of these guidelines,
which differ from one period and style of jazz to
another.”21 If the structural level at which the jazz
work is located differs from work to work and
from one period to another, as it does in classical
music, then the period in which a particular standard is composed determines the ontology of that
work. Take Ellington, for example—as good an
example as there is of a composer of jazz works.
If Ellington composed “Sophisticated Lady” with
a particular ensemble in mind (characterized in
terms of number and kind of instruments, say),
and his musico-historical context allows such
things to be work-determinative, then on the
current proposal, any authentic performance of
that work will require that same ensemble, just
as any authentic performance of Bach’s Fifth
Brandenburg Concerto requires a harpsichord.
But the jazz case clearly does not parallel the
classical here. Chick Corea’s performance of “Sophisticated Lady” is just as authentic as anyone
else’s—for instance, Ellington’s—despite its utilizing very different forces, containing no obvious
statement of the melody, and substituting chords
all over the place. One response to this example
is to claim that I have beefed up Ellington’s work,
claimed it is thicker than it in fact is. This response
inherits all the problems of the theory that jazz
works are ontologically very thin. But the more
serious problem for the ontological variety Young
and Matheson propose is that the variation in
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performance guidelines “from one period and
style of jazz to another” is not variation that would
affect how to extract a piece from a performance
or score, say, as the relevant variation does in classical music. Thus, it is not variation in the ontology
of various works. Rather, the variation in jazz is
variation in the performance guidelines about how
to approach any given piece. Corea approaches
“Sophisticated Lady” in a very different way from
Ellington, which is different again from Charlie
Parker’s approach. If this is variation in ontology,
then Young and Matheson are saying that Corea’s
“Sophisticated Lady” is a different work from
Ellington’s. And this is clearly not their intention.
Thus, their proposal of a variable ontology of jazz
does not solve the problem of the location of the
work.
I have expressed skepticism about two views
of how we should characterize jazz works if the
ontology of jazz is like that of classical music: the
view that all works in the tradition are thin and
the view that there is an ontological variety of
works in the tradition. This alone suggests it would
be worthwhile investigating alternative ontological models. But it might also seem to leave me
with a significant datum about jazz practice unexplained, namely, the fact that jazz performers and
audiences routinely identify jazz performances as
versions (let us say, not to beg any questions) of
“Sophisticated Lady,” “Don’t Get Around Much
Anymore,” and so on. Does the fact that there is
convergence on these judgments not suggest that
there is some thread running through all versions
of “Sophisticated Lady” that the performers are
clinging to and audiences detecting? Something
like this is doubtless going on a lot of the time.
But it is important to realize that this feature of
jazz practice could be accounted for under various
ontological models. For instance, I have argued
elsewhere that a rock “cover” does not stand to
the song it shares with its “original” in the same
relation that a classical performance stands to the
work it is of.22 Similarly, the fact that two jazz
performances entitled “Sophisticated Lady” have
something in common does not immediately imply
that the thing in question is a work of which these
are performances (in the sense of these terms operative in classical practice). Further, though more
controversially, I would argue that these sorts of
connections are of relatively little interest to jazz
musicians and audiences, compared with the interest of a classical audience in what work is being
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performed. I return to this point at the end of the
article.
ii. Improvisation.
A different objection that
might be raised against the idea that jazz is a tradition wherein enduring pieces are given repeated
performances is that jazz is essentially an improvisatory tradition.23 If improvisation is central to
a jazz performance, then surely the performance
cannot be of a preexisting work?
Consideration of classical music shows that the
inclusion of improvisation in a performance is not
a guarantee that there is no enduring work being
instantiated. Consider our Mozart piano concerto
again. The fact that such a work contains one or
more “gaps” wherein the soloist is supposed to
improvise a cadenza, displaying both her understanding of the work and her technical prowess,
does not militate against Mozart’s concertos’ being works of art in the relevant sense. Or, going
further back, consider baroque ensemble compositions. They frequently contain continuo parts
wherein only the melody, bass line, and harmonies
are determined. The individual notes of the inner
voices which realize those harmonies are at the
discretion of the performer, and a performer well
versed in this tradition is able to improvise such
counterpoint on the spot. In these works, as in
jazz performance, improvisation is required of the
performer. They are works nonetheless.
On the other hand, it is uncommon to find
works in the classical tradition that are as thoroughly or centrally improvisatory as jazz works
must be if they are like classical works ontologically. There will be examples, of course,
from the late twentieth-century avant-garde, but
these are protests against the tradition rather
than paradigms, whereas highly improvisatory
jazz works are paradigmatic. Moreover, in classical performances where there is an amount of improvisation similar to that in a jazz performance,
we are not so ready to call the performance one
of a preexisting work. Stephen Davies gives the
example of Bach’s improvisation of a three-voice
ricercar on a theme provided by King Frederick II
of Prussia. It would be wrong to call Bach’s performance a performance of Frederick’s work. What
Frederick provided was something like a springboard for Bach’s creativity.24 Thus, if we are to
follow through with the parallel to classical music,
we must similarly conclude that jazz improvisations are not performances of preexisting works.
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Despite (or because of) its centrality in the
philosophical literature on jazz, there has been
much confusion over the concept of improvisation and its relations to performances, works, and
scores. While there is no space here to engage with
all the literature on the nature of improvisation,
I offer a gloss of the term that I hope many will
find intuitive, and compare it with a few recent
alternative suggestions.25 I take the concept to be
quite general, but to put it in musical terms, an
improvisation is a performance event guided by
decisions about that event made by the performer
shortly before the event takes place. ‘Shortly before’ should be construed so as to make the inclusion of “spontaneity” in the proposed definition
redundant.26 This account allows for free improvisation and for improvisation in the performance of
a piece. It also entails that one cannot necessarily
tell just from listening to a performance whether
it is improvised, or which aspects of it are; there is
an intentional aspect to improvisation. If a classical performer has practiced his interpretation of a
piece over and over again, but during the performance “loses it” for a moment and plays a cluster
chord where he did not intend one (even at that
moment, causing him to curse under his breath),
that is not improvisation. On the other hand, a
classical performer may improvise her interpretation anew during each performance.27 The proposal differs from previous accounts such as those
of Philip Alperson and of Gould and Keaton in not
requiring that the decisions be about a work.28 It
also differs from Gould and Keaton’s proposal in
requiring spontaneity. I take both of these to be
prima facie advantages of my account over these
others.
My account also differs from Young and
Matheson’s in one important respect. Young and
Matheson argue that “an improvised performance
is one in which the structural properties of a performance are not completely determined by decisions made prior to the time of performance,”
where “structural properties” include “melody,
harmony, and length” as opposed to “expressive
properties” like “tempo, the use of vibrato, dynamic, and so on.”29 I reject this restriction of the
domain of improvisatory decisions. I see no reason to deny that a performer could improvise, say,
the rubato in her performance. Nor do Young and
Matheson provide an argument for this conclusion. They claim that “the line between expressive
and structural properties . . . must be drawn if we
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are to avoid the conclusion that virtually every musical performance involves improvisation.”30 But
when it comes to the example that is supposed to
“clarify this point,” we hear that a “concert pianist
who performs a Beethoven sonata does not improvise. . . . Even if the player spontaneously adds
rubato or varies the tempo, she or he is not improvising . . . since she or he is simply varying the
expressive properties of the work.”31 This is a circular argument if ever there was one. A further
question the proposal raises is what the status of
the expressive properties of a (structural) improvisation is. Since the notes of the improvisation have
not been worked out in advance, neither, presumably, have the expressive properties. But according
to Young and Matheson, such properties cannot
be improvised. Perhaps their view is that the improvisation of structural features opens the way
for the improvisation of the expressive features.
But this seems an arbitrary restriction on the possibility of improvising expressive features.
Young and Matheson are right to emphasize
that a performance can be improvisatory without
being completely improvised from scratch.32 One
can practice improvising, work up a repertoire of
licks, figure out various ways around tricky progressions, and so on. As we have already seen,
even “free” jazz improvisations are not without
their implicit conventions. But I see broader scope
for “improvisation” than Young and Matheson do.
At the minimal end of the improvisation spectrum,
I would place a performance of a classical work
where the performer decides to improvise the vibrato, or rubato, or tone color of a short part of
the piece. There will be no way for the audience
to know that the performer is so improvising, nor
would the improvisation be noteworthy, even if
well executed. And such improvisation would be
well within the bounds of a completely authentic
performance of, say, a Romantic violin sonata. In
a jazz solo, of course, we expect a performer not
to have memorized exactly which notes she will
play during a given performance. But across the
board we can roughly say that the more decisions
get made during the performance, the more improvisatory it is.33
It is worth noting that I have ignored the
question of what determines whether a given
performance is an improvisation, preferring instead to discuss whether a given performance
event is improvisatory. Although, in our discourse
about music at least, we tend to talk more about
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“improvisations” than “improvisatory” events or
features, I believe that there is no clear line between “an improvisation” and a performance with
many improvisatory elements. This suggests that
there may simply be no answer to the question of
what makes a performance an improvisation.34
To return to the point of this exploration of
the nature of improvisation and its role in jazz:
while we have seen that “improvisation” is univocal across the classical and jazz traditions, this
does not by itself answer any ontological questions about jazz, even given an ontology of classical music. Neither what is notated in the jazz
tradition nor the mere fact that there is improvisation in a jazz performance proves that there
are not enduring works in the jazz tradition that
are instanced in performances. However, the sheer
amount of improvisation in a typical jazz performance and the centrality of improvisation to the
tradition seem to indicate that the proposed candidate for the enduring work in jazz, the standard,
is more an aid to the performers’ real-time creativity, like Frederick’s theme for Bach’s ricercar, than
a work to be instanced in multiple performances,
like Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony.35
iii. The Centrality of Performances. As a final
line of defense, the ontologist who believes that
jazz and classical music share an ontology might
point to the most convincing cases for that commonality: apparent works for performance that
receive multiple performances and have very little room for improvisation. Duke Ellington provides some good examples of this as a central figure in the evolution of jazz widely considered to
be one of America’s great composers. Ellington’s
“Concerto for Cootie” seems to be a work like
a classical concerto: fully scored for a particular kind of ensemble and, while making use
of a particular performer’s skills, leaving no
more room for improvisation than a typical late
Romantic work for performance. One might similarly argue that many of Ellington’s arrangements for his band over his lifetime are ontologically like classical works and transcriptions.
Many are completely scored, with little room for
improvisation.
I argue, though, that in the case of Ellington’s
various arrangements of a given piece, such as
“Rockin’ in Rhythm,” and in jazz more generally,
what we have is not one work, several transcriptions of that work, and multiple performances
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of each transcription, but more simply a host of
performances to be compared with one another,
on their own terms as it were, rather than as performances of some other entity—a work.36 Why?
First, the incessant rearranging that Ellington
did of almost all his pieces suggests that he was
constantly thinking of new ways to produce
exciting performances, rather than perfecting an
enduring entity. Of course, classical composers
revise their works, but even in the most extreme
cases, there are nowhere near the number of
reworkings common in jazz, even with such a
“composerly” musician as Ellington. Another
sign that Ellington is focused on the performance
rather than some reinstantiable work is that his
arrangements were made for particular personnel
as his ensemble changed, focusing on their
particular abilities. Again, classical composers
write with particular performers in mind, but they
cannot restrict the performance of their works to
particular performers.37 As André Hodeir writes,
“the ‘classical’ composer can still afford not to
know who is going to play his music; this attitude
is out of the question for the true jazz composer.
It would be unthinkable for an arranger to have
a piece played by Duke Ellington’s band when it
was originally written for Count Basie’s.”38
Second, the very few instances where Ellington
(or anyone else) did not rearrange a piece but
continued to perform it, as with “Concerto for
Cootie,” are not enough to determine the ontology of the entire tradition. Compare the practice
of “remakes” in film. A small number of remakes
are very close to their originals—Gus Van Sant’s
Psycho (1998), for instance. This does not make
cinema an art form of interpreted instances of
works—the shot structure that Van Sant’s movie
shares with Hitchcock’s, for instance. Nor does it
make it the case that in this one particular case we
have such an isolated ontology. Van Sant’s work is
a work of cinema and thus shares its ontology with
the other works in that tradition.39 Performances
of “Concerto for Cootie” are jazz performances
and thus not performances of works despite their
superficial similarity with the ontology of classical
music (contra Hodeir).40 A succinct way of putting
these points is that no sound structure that any jazz
performances share is a primary focus of critical
attention in the jazz tradition.
The above reflections on the problem of locating the jazz work, if any, the nature and role of
improvisation in jazz, and the relations between
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various jazz performances with the same name
strongly suggest that jazz is not ontologically like
classical music: it is not a tradition of performances
of works.

ii. jazz performances as works
An obvious way to develop the ideas sketched
above would be to suggest that though jazz performances are not works in the classical sense of
being for repeated performance, they are
nonetheless products of intentional human action intended for aesthetic appreciation (or whatever you think makes something art) and thus
are artworks just as much as sculptures or symphonies are. That is, the event itself, rather than
the sound structure it instantiates, is a work of art.
This view is defended by Philip Alperson and arguably by Garry Hagberg and Stephen Davies.41
Though Alperson talks of the improviser as the
spontaneous composer of a sound structure, he
also argues that improvisations should not be
heard as interpretations of works and that “if anything, musical improvisation seems ontologically
closer to the creation of a wood sculpture . . . than
to a conventional [that is, classical] musical performance.”42 Hagberg explicitly argues for the
“work-indeterminacy” of jazz as a result of the
considerations discussed in the previous section.
But I think that without his implicit assumption
that works of art in jazz must be repeatable sound
structures, he might be tempted by the view that
jazz performances themselves are works of art.
I have no objection to the basic idea behind this
suggestion, that individual performances in their
own right (as opposed to those performances considered as performances of independent works)
are the primary focus of critical attention in jazz.
However, I believe that there are compelling reasons to reject the characterization of this view as
the view that jazz performances are works of art,
strictly speaking. Recall that this is a project in
comparative musical ontology. Thus, we ought to
use our terms consistently if at all possible. And
one central term in any art-ontological discussion
is ‘work.’ What do we mean when we say that a particular type of entity is “the work of art” in some
tradition? I suggested above that at the very least
we seem to mean that it is a primary focus of appreciation in the tradition. But we must mean more
than that. Performances of classical works are a
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primary focus of appreciation, yet we do not call
them works of art in their own right (except occasionally in an honorific sense). What distinguishes
classical musical works from performances, I suggest, is that works are enduring entities or, more
prosaically, objects. This, then, is at least one further condition we require for being a work of art.43
Again, this is a claim in higher-level ontology. I am
not taking a stand here on the distinction between
objects and events, as someone debating metaphysical four-dimensionalism might. Rather, I am
suggesting that the distinction we ordinarily make
between objects and events marks one boundary
between what might be a work of art and what
could not be.
Having said this, I should note that it is not the
words we use but the concepts they stand for that
I am most interested in here. I mentioned at the
outset three different ways in which we commonly
use the term ‘work of art.’ We could certainly use
the term to refer to things that are simply a primary focus of appreciation in the arts, regardless
of whether they are objects or events. But if we
did so, we would need another term to mark the
subset of these things that we treat differently—
those that are enduring entities. Given the way we
use these terms pretheoretically, however, I see no
reason to adopt this new usage.
If all this is correct, then jazz performances cannot be works of art, at least in the sense in which
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is a work of art. Jazz
performances are surely a primary focus of appreciation in the jazz tradition, but they are not
enduring entities. If Alperson and Hagberg were
to agree with my general conclusions about works
of art, their views could easily be modified into
the ontology of jazz I ultimately defend here. We
disagree not about the nature of jazz, I believe,
but about the nature of artworks. Thus, I will focus here not on their arguments, but on the roles
that the concepts of work and performance play
in creative and appreciative musical practice, in
an attempt to bolster the idea that musical works
must be enduring entities.
First, recall that if jazz performances are works
of art in their own right, then so must classical
performances be, since classical performances are
produced with an eye to their being aesthetically
rewarding (or whatever your criterion of arthood
requires) and are a primary focus of appreciation
in the classical tradition. Yet, in classical music,
performances are precisely distinguished from the
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works they are of. Of course, an advocate of this
proposal might recommend this change to classical discourse, pointing to the ill-founded but
long-running valorization of the work over performance in musicology and aesthetics. But we
can do away with this baseless valorization without having to change our concept of a work of art.
The sense of ‘work of art’ that we are concerned
with is not an evaluative one, thus it would not
be a slur on jazz to claim that there were no jazz
works in this sense.
A more important consideration, however, has
to do with the durability of works of art, compared
with the fleeting nature of jazz performances. This
is where Alperson’s comparison of jazz performances with wood sculptures breaks down. Works
of art are not just things intended to be worthy of
aesthetic appreciation, but things worked on over
time so that their aesthetic or artistic value can be
maximized.44 Jazz performance, to the extent that
it is improvisatory, is not perfected ahead of time,
like these paradigms of work creation. And note
that this is precisely one of the grounds upon which
jazz music has been misevaluated throughout its
history. Critics familiar with other musical traditions have accused jazz of being harmonically uninventive and of containing lots of wrong notes, in
both senses of “inappropriate for this musical moment” and “poorly executed.” Discussing Miles
Davis, for example, Robert Walser writes:
“The problem of Miles Davis” is the problem Davis
presents to critics and historians: how are we to account
for such glaring defects in the performances of someone
who is indisputably one of the most important musicians
in the history of jazz? . . . The uneasiness many critics
display toward Davis’s “mistakes,” and their failure to
explain the power of his playing, suggest that there are
important gaps in the paradigms of musical analysis and
interpretation that dominate jazz studies.45

Admittedly, some of these criticisms have been
the result of critics’ ignorance of jazz’s harmonic
traditions (for instance, the neutral third it inherited from some West African music) and
its widened conception of timbral possibilities
(stretching back through Ellington’s horns’ jungle effect, to precursors such as Robert Johnson’s
blues guitar and Leadbelly’s field-holler vocal inflections). But much of it has come, I think, from
a misconception of jazz performances as like, or
intended to be like, classical works—worked out in

Kania All Play and No Work
advance to maximize their aesthetic value. Those
knowledgeable about jazz, on the other hand,
have found value precisely in the in-the-moment
extemporizing that jazz performance makes possible. Note also that if this “perfectibility” is a
mark of work-hood, then classical performances
are more like works of art than jazz performances
since in the classical tradition one is expected to
learn the piece and work out one’s interpretation
thoroughly before performing it. Though one does
something akin to this in preparing for jazz performances—developing improvisatory techniques,
learning various changes, building a repertoire of
licks—one cannot work out one’s improvisation
ahead of time; it would no longer be an improvisation, for the reasons discussed above. Thus, if one
is content with the traditional division of classical
music into works and (nonwork) performances of
them, one can only hold that jazz performances
are works of art on pain of inconsistency.

iii. jazz recordings as works
It has been argued that the work of art in rock
music is the recording, that these are the enduring
entities that are the primary focus of appreciation
in the rock tradition.46 This theory might be coopted by the jazz ontologist as a third proposal.
For recordings provide a way to turn a fleeting
performance event into an enduring object. As
far as I know, no one has proposed this as a theory
of jazz ontology. However, Lee B. Brown conjectures that “as recorded, [jazz] may have an entirely
different phenomenology from that of the living
thing. Indeed, it may have a different ontology.”47
He also claims that André Hodeir’s talk of jazz
“works” clearly refers to recordings.48
Theodore Gracyk, in his arguments for recordings’ being the works of art of rock music, points to
the centrality of records in the tradition: records,
rather than live performances, are what people
mainly talk about in rock, and people learn how
to play by listening to and imitating their favorite
records.49 Similar claims could be made about
jazz. Musicians exchange and talk about recordings; they learn to play by imitating their favorite
recordings; and the recording studio has had other
wide-reaching effects on the history of jazz. For instance, Louis Armstrong and his Hot Five played
only in the recording studio, in part because local
Chicago audiences did not want to hear their hot
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New Orleans style. Without recording technology,
then, it is not clear they could have had so great
an influence on jazz.
However, as I have written elsewhere:
For all the similarities, there are important differences
between rock and jazz approaches to recording; here
jazz seems to be a lot closer to classical music than it is
to rock. Just as notation enabled classical composers to
create more and more complex enduring musical works,
recordings enable the preservation of works with all the
replete detail of a sound event. Rock, like classical electronic composition, embraced this aspect of recording
technology to the extent that informed rock audiences
do not expect rock recordings to be transparent to live
performance events. Both classical and jazz audiences,
on the other hand, expect the phenomenal performance
heard on a recording to be connected to the active performance of the musicians in the right way. Different
takes may be spliced together, and extraneous noise removed, but nothing should be done to cause the recording to represent a sound event that the musicians would
be incapable of producing live. As live performance traditions, both classical and jazz music have embraced
recording technology’s ability to represent artists’ capabilities in the best light, but both traditions maintain
a distinction between authentic recording practice and
studio trickery. In both traditions, one is supposed to
listen through the recording to the represented performance, rather than to the recording as a studio construction.50

It is also worth noting an argument parallel to
one given in the previous section: if one argues
that jazz recordings are works of art in their own
right, classical recordings must be too, by parity
of reasoning. But, again, though some might embrace this conclusion, note that (i) recordings must
be works in a different sense from that ordinarily
applied, since a recording of Elgar’s Sea Pictures
in some sense manifests the “ordinary” work—
the orchestral songs, and (ii) as in the case of live
performances, classical recordings probably have
more claim to being works of art than jazz recordings, since the interpretations they contain can be
worked on over time with a clear conscience, unlike jazz improvisations. These consequences are
to be avoided if possible. Another way of grasping
this point is to think about the asymmetric dependence of recorded jazz practices on live jazz practices, just as is the case with classical music, in stark
contrast to rock, as I have argued elsewhere.51
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Jazz and classical music are alike, then, in being
live performance traditions. But they are unalike
in that classical performances are performances
of works, while jazz performances are not. I have
also argued that jazz performances, like all performances, cannot be works of art. What views
remain for the jazz ontologist to subscribe to?

iv. jazz as an art without works
A final possibility, the one I favor, is that in jazz
there are no artworks. This view is implicit in an article by Brown.52 It is more explicit in his own later
summary of that article’s conclusions: “A genuinely improvisational performance, even though
based upon . . . a mini-work [such as a Broadway
tune], is not itself a musical work, with everything
that this concept implies. In particular . . . such a
performance is not re-identifiable in multiple instances.”53
Stephen Davies argues that jazz performances
are not performances of works, but he does not
go so far as to say that there are no works in jazz.
Rather, he implies that in jazz the performance is
the artwork, as noted above.54
My view may sound unappealing and unnecessary. It sounds unappealing if you think of the
production of artworks as the central goal of any
artistic tradition.55 But there is no reason why this
should be so. I have already mentioned my agreement with much recent musicology that performances should not be given second place to works
in discussions of classical music. So why should
an art with only performances and no works be
considered inferior to one with only works (such
as sculpture) or one with both works and performances (such as classical music)?
My view may sound unnecessary since one
could accept all that I have said above and yet
find enduring musical objects in the jazz tradition.
But this is to ignore the distinction between artworks and other kinds of art objects. Ellington
wrote parts for his musicians to play, and he expected them to stick to what he wrote, just as a
classical composer expects her performers to play
what she wrote. Ellington thereby brought a multiply instantiable sound structure into existence.
But where Ellington crucially differs from the classical composer is that he did not expect nor even
desire future performers—himself and his band included—to play what he wrote on this occasion.
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This is bound up with the fact that future performances that are “of the same piece” do not
get assessed as instances of some third entity—the
work. Just as rock covers are compared directly
with one another, not (primarily) as performances
of the same song, so jazz performances based on
the same head get compared directly with one another, not (primarily) as performances of the same
work. Standards such as Ellington’s are worthy of
attention, but in jazz such compositions are more
vehicles for performances than vice versa. This can
be seen in a whole range of jazz practices, from
the complete normalcy of picking and choosing
whatever aspects of the standard suit the contingencies of the performance and preferences of the
performers to the jokey arbitrariness with which
many improvisations, though destined to become
standards, are named.
In summary: jazz, like classical music and unlike rock, is a live-performance tradition. However, the centrality of improvisation to jazz and
the direct comparison of performances with one
another, rather than as instances of some separate
enduring entity, show that, unlike classical music,
jazz is not a work-performance tradition. Since
performances are different kinds of things from
works of art, yet are the primary focus of critical
attention in jazz, I conclude that jazz is a tradition
without works. This should not be misunderstood
as an evaluative claim. The benefit of thinking of
jazz in this way is a clearer understanding of what
is distinctive about what jazz musicians and audiences do, compared with musicians and audiences
in other musical traditions.56
ANDREW KANIA

Department of Philosophy
Trinity University
San Antonio, Texas 78212
internet: akania@trinity.edu

1. For an introduction to the philosophical literature on
musical recordings, see Andrew Kania, “Musical Recordings,” Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 22–38.
2. Andrew Kania, “New Waves in Musical Ontology,” in
New Waves in Aesthetics, ed. Kathleen Stock and Katherine
Thomson-Jones (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),
pp. 20–40, at pp. 32–35.
3. Others who have appealed to this kind of concept
include Theodore Gracyk, in his Rhythm and Noise: An
Aesthetics of Rock (Duke University Press, 1996), and David
Davies, in Art as Performance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

Kania All Play and No Work
4. For ease of exposition, I sometimes use the language
of a position I ultimately reject, for instance, talking about
a performance of a jazz work. But by the end of the article, the reader should see how I intend to rephrase such
formulations in the language of my final proposal.
5. There is much more to be said here about the methodology of art ontology, but no room to say it. For a start, see
Davies, Art as Performance, pp. 16–24, and David Davies,
“The Primacy of Practice in the Ontology of Art,” The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2009): 159–171;
Robert Stecker, “Methodological Questions about the Ontology of Music,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
67 (2009): 375–386; and Andrew Kania, “The Methodology
of Musical Ontology: Descriptivism and Its Implications,”
The British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 426–444.
6. Usually a few early singers are mentioned—Bessie
Smith, Billie Holiday, and Louis Armstrong—to illustrate
the conflation of vocal and instrumental sounds that began
in the early days of jazz. But the vocal tradition usually drops
out of the picture around the Swing era. See, for example,
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University Press, 2008), pp. 3–21, at p. 13. To the extent that
jazz fusion is a fusion of jazz and rock techniques, it should
be obvious why I hesitate to include fusion in my general
theory. It is plausible that the ontological theory of rock that
I have been considering here, or some variation on it, could
be applied to fusion.
51. “Making Tracks,” pp. 403–404. Indeed, due to the
centrality of improvisation to jazz, even less studio manipulation is standardly allowed. For instance, individual note
correction is much rarer.
52. Brown, “Musical Works.” Note that Brown now rejects the view. See his “Do Higher-Order Musical Ontologies Rest on a Mistake?” The British Journal of Aesthetics 51
(2011): 169–184, especially pp. 175–179. I should note that
although the latter article predates this one, Brown there
responds to my arguments here. I have made some minor
changes to this article in the meantime; I apologize to Brown
and the reader for any resulting confusion.
53. Lee B. Brown, “‘Feeling My Way’: Jazz Improvisation and Its Vicissitudes—A Plea for Imperfection,” The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (2000): 112–123, at
p. 115.
54. S. Davies, Musical Works and Performances, pp.
16–19; Stephen Davies, “Ontology of Art,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 155–180, at p. 156.
55. Young and Matheson (“The Metaphysics of Jazz”)
and Hagberg (“On Representing Jazz”) beg the question of
whether there are works in jazz by simply beginning their

Kania All Play and No Work
inquiries with the question of what, rather than whether,
works exist in jazz.
56. For helpful discussion of these issues, I thank Jerrold
Levinson, an anonymous referee for the journal, and the
audience at my presentation of an earlier version of this
article at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Society

403
for Aesthetics in Milwaukee. I am especially indebted to Lee
Brown, not only for his comments on that occasion but also
for teaching me so much about jazz and philosophy over the
past thirteen years. Judging by his recent essay, “Do HigherOrder Musical Ontologies Rest on a Mistake?” I still have
a lot to learn.

